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From Paradigm-Based Explanation
to Pragmatic Genealogy
MATTHIEU QUELOZ
Why would philosophers interested in the points or functions of our concep-
tual practices bother with genealogical explanations if they can focus directly
on paradigmatic examples of the practices we now have? To answer this
question, I compare the method of pragmatic genealogy advocated by Edward
Craig, Bernard Williams, and Miranda Fricker—a method whose singular
combination of fictionalising and historicising has met with suspicion—with
the simpler method of paradigm-based explanation. Fricker herself has recently
moved towards paradigm-based explanation, arguing that it is a more perspic-
uous way of reaping the same explanatory pay-off as pragmatic genealogy
while dispensing with its fictionalising and historicising. My aim is to deter-
mine when and why the reverse movement from paradigm-based explanation
to pragmatic genealogy remains warranted. I argue that the fictionalising and
historicising of pragmatic genealogy is well-motivated, and I outline three
ways in which the method earns its keep: by successfully handling histori-
cally inflected practices which paradigm-based explanation cannot handle; by
revealing and arguing for connections to generic needs we might otherwise
miss; and by providing comprehensive views of practices that place and relate
the respects in which they serve both generic and local needs.
ABSTRACT
P hilosophers seeking to understand the points or functions of ourpractices of living by certain concepts, values, and virtues—our
conceptual practices—face a choice: should they turn directly to the
history-laden tangle of our actual practices and try to discern the point of
individual elements? Or should they approach our practices indirectly,
via the prior or prototypical forms out of which they have developed?
It is the latter form of point-based explanation that was advocated
by Edward Craig (1990, 1993), Bernard Williams (2002), and Miranda
Fricker (2007). They sought to identify, respectively, the point of the
concept of knowledge, the point of valuing the truth, and the point of
the virtue of testimonial justice by offering what I shall call pragmatic
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genealogies: fictionalising and historicising narratives that first reveal
the point, for creatures like us, of a simple prototype of a conceptual
practice in a fictional ‘state of nature’ before explaining—in a way that
may, as inWilliams’s case, increasingly involve actual history—how this
prototype might have developed into the practice we actually have.1
But even philosophers sympathetic to genealogical explanations
have tended either to endorse the historicising while failing to see
the point of the fictionalising (Dutilh Novaes 2015; Hacking 2005, p.
168; Koopman 2009; 2013, p. 71), or to endorse the fictionalising while
seeing no real need for the historicising (Blackburn 2013b; Craig 2007;
Price 2011; M. Williams 2013).2 This is why, more recently, Miranda
Fricker has moved away from pragmatic genealogy towards a non-
genealogical sibling of themethodwhichdirectlymoves in on our actual
conceptual practices and thereby dispenses with the singularmixture of
historicising and fictionalising that philosophers have been reluctant to
adopt. This pared-down, non-genealogical method is what Fricker calls
paradigm-based explanation: focusing on a real and paradigmatic instance
of a currentpractice,wehypothesise its point anduse it to explain further
forms of the practice as derivatives of the paradigm case that serve the
same overarching point in different ways. Paradigm-based explanation
is explicitly offered ‘as a more straightforward and transparent way
of achieving the very same explanatory pay-off’ (Fricker Forthcoming,
p. 4) that pragmatic genealogies achieve with their fictionalising and
historicising. But if the same pay-off can be reaped with a simpler
1 In Queloz (2018b), I offer a reconstruction of Williams’s genealogy explaining how
it can coherently involve itself in history while remaining a pragmatic genealogy
starting out from a fictional state of nature. For a reconstruction of Craig’s genealogy
as a pragmatic genealogy, see Queloz (2019). For a disambiguation of the notion of
the point of conceptual practices, see Queloz (Forthcoming).
2 Some, like Elizabeth Fricker, take issue with genealogising of any kind in a point-
based explanation (Fricker 2015), while others see no point in pursuing point-based
explanations (Kornblith 2011).
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approach, why should someone interested in identifying the points
of conceptual practices bother with genealogy? Why should we go
in for the fictionalising and historicising if they are just unnecessary
complications?
My aim in this paper is to offer an account of pragmatic genealogy
which defends the method’s place in our repertoire alongside its non-
genealogical sibling and which vindicates its fictionalising as well as its
historicising.3 I aim to show when and why someone interested in the
point of our conceptual practices has reason to move from paradigm-
based explanation to pragmatic genealogy. To this end, I argue that the
fictionalising and historicising of pragmatic genealogy proves its worth
by allowing us to deal with historically inflected conceptual practices
which lack a paradigm case or an obvious connection to generic human
needs.
I proceed as follows: in §1, I develop a taxonomy of four increasingly
complex forms of point-based explanation which allows us to make
sense of genealogical fictionalising and historicising as well-motivated
elaborations of paradigm-based explanation. In §2, I contrast Fricker’s
interpretation of pragmatic genealogies as elaborate ways of achieving
the same explanatory pay-off as paradigm-based explanations with
a different interpretation of pragmatic genealogies on which their
explanatory reach goes beyond that of paradigm-based explanations.
3 I thereby defend pragmatic genealogy against a wider set of approaches, because
Fricker’s paradigm-based explanation is emblematic of a range of methods that
similarly try to get at the point of a conceptual practice synchronically rather than
genealogically: practical explication as characterised by Kappel (2010) and Gardiner
(2015), for example, or Elizabeth Fricker’s current-role account of concepts (2015),
or the neo-pragmatist explanations of various types of discourse in terms of their
functions advocated by Blackburn (2013a, 2013b), Price (2011; 2013), M. Williams
(2013) and Misak (2015) among others. What makes Miranda Fricker’s version
particularly apt for my purposes is that she comes to paradigm-based explanation
from pragmatic genealogy.
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I argue for three claims: (i) pragmatic genealogies get a grip even
where a paradigm case is lacking by constructing a prototype; (ii)
pragmatic genealogies need not assume that generic human needs are
still informative, but can offer an argument for this; (iii) insofar as
elucidations of our current ways of going on in light of generic human
needs come up short due to historical change, pragmatic genealogies
can remedy this by augmenting the explanations with local needs.
1. Four Types of Point-Based Explanation
Miranda Fricker (2016, Forthcoming) argues that when dealing with
conceptual practices that are internally diverse, held together by criss-
crossing relations of family-resemblance rather than a common core, the
standard approach of conceptual analysis is the wrong approach to take.
Conceptual analysis aims to spell out definitions in terms of necessary
and sufficient conditions, to be measured against our current intuitions
about what falls under a given concept. Any feature that is not strictly
a necessary condition will eventually fall prey to counterexamples and
drop out of the final analysis. But why should we assume that all and
only instances of a concept share a set of features explaining why they
are subsumable under that concept? Boiling them down to their highest
common factor is likely to leave us either with a definition that is too
thin to be informative, or with no definition at all. This worry is familiar
enough, but Fricker then makes a further point: even where definitions
in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions are available, the features
that are illuminating for the purposes of philosophy may not all be
among the necessary conditions (2016, p. 166). Why something exists,
how it functions, and what its value is, may well be best explained by
features which, though characteristic, distinctive, or typical, are not
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invariably present. Evenwhen conceptual analysis is possible, therefore,
it may not be our best option.
This is why Fricker adapts fromCraig (1990) andWilliams (2002) the
idea that when dealing with a phenomenon that is internally diverse,
such as the practice of blame, we should seek to make sense of it in
terms of the point it serves in paradigm cases rather than to try and
define it in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. To grasp the
point of a practice, on this view, is to understand the most salient useful
difference it makes to the lives of the creatures engaging in that practice,
where usefulness is cashed out in terms of the practice’s tendency to
help satisfy the needs of these creatures. It is to grasp what the practice
adds, and consequently also what would be lost if it were abandoned.
Viewing our practices of living by certain concepts, values, or virtues
as akin to tools or techniques, we can ask what they do for us. The
diversity that stood in the way of conceptual analysis then becomes
intelligible as reflecting the diversity of conditions under which these
techniques typically serve a function, conditions which need be neither
necessary nor sufficient. This approach imposes order on the practice
while accounting for its internal diversity by exhibiting its various
features as more or less directly subservient to an overarching point.
In Fricker’s paradigm-based explanation of blame, the paradigm
case is Communicative Blame: A wrongs B and B tells A with feeling
that A is at fault. The point of this, according to Fricker, is to align
A’s and B’s moral sensibilities (2016, p. 167). She seeks to derive an
understanding of other types of blame, such as self-blame or blame of
absent third parties, from our understanding of Communicative Blame,
giving us an explanatory grip on the practice by organising it around
the paradigm case. But besides being explanatorily basic, the paradigm
case is also presented as forming a direct response to a practical need
for moral alignment: given that need, Communicative Blame is shown
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to be near-indispensable or necessary. This allows us to rationalise the
practice by revealing whywe go in for it; and it allows us to differentiate
between its more basic and indispensable manifestations and its more
derivative and contingent manifestations. To realise whether and how a
practice responds to certain needs is also to realise that, insofar as these
are needs we are identified with, they provide reasons to engage in the
practice. As a result, we acquire a critical grip on the practice: we come
to see which forms of the practice we have strong reasons to engage in
because they answer to practical exigencies, and which might sensibly
be put into question or even taxed as dysfunctional.4
On the interpretation of pragmatic genealogy I wish to defend, it is
best understood as an elaboration of paradigm-based explanation. It goes
beyond the ground it shares with paradigm-based explanation in two
respects: (a) it constructs models, in particular hypothetical prototypes
of our conceptual practices; and (b) it introduces a dynamic dimension
to help us understand how we might have got from these prototypes
to the practices we actually have.5 These are the two senses in which
pragmatic genealogy can rightly be said to fictionalise and to historicise.
How pragmatic genealogy forms an elaboration of paradigm-based
explanation becomes evident if we juxtapose them along with their
intermediaries:6
4 I say more about the sense in which needs provide reasons to engage in a practice or
particular forms of a practice in Queloz (2018a). For a nuanced discussion of how
genealogies can provide reasons for or against beliefs, see Srinivasan (2015).
5 Recent examples of pragmatic genealogies include Kusch and McKenna (2018b);
Pettit (2018).
6 For a related taxonomy of what I call point-based explanations, see Gardiner (2015).
Her ‘practical explication’ corresponds tomy (1),while her ‘hypothetical genealogical
teleology’ corresponds to my (3). The present taxonomy differs from hers in two
respects: it adds (2) as an intermediate type of point-based explanation; and it adds
(4) as a kind of hybrid between historical and hypothetical genealogy, which, on
Gardiner’s taxonomy, are presented as distinct enterprises. I agree with Gardiner
that they can be entirely distinct enterprises. But my concern here is to make room
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(1) paradigm-based explanation: identify an actual paradigm case of
practice X, hypothesise its point, identify the needs it answers to,
and use this instrumental relation to certain needs to elucidate
practice X; (1) is exemplified by Fricker’s account of blame (2016).
(2) prototype-based explanation: construct a model of target practice X,
hypothesise the point of this proto-practice, identify the needs
it answers to within the model, and use the model to identify
analogous and disanalogous instrumental relations in target
practice X; (2) has the character of Wittgensteinian explanations
in terms of fictional objects of comparisonwhose similarities and
dissimilarities to our ways of going on are meant to elucidate
them.7
(3) generic pragmatic genealogy: on the basis of an initial hypothesis
about the original point of target practice X, construct a dynamic
model showing why creatures like us would develop a proto-
typical version of the target practice by identifying root needs
generating a problem to which the proto-practice forms a salient
solution; then consider the proto-practice’s elaboration in re-
sponse to further generic needs anticipatable from within the
for the hybrid form that I take Williams’s genealogy to instantiate: the historically
informed pragmatic genealogy that starts out from generic needs, but then draws on
history to de-idealise its model and incorporate ever more socio-historically local
needs.
7 ‘Our clear and simple language-games are not preliminary studies for a future
regimentation of language—as it were, first approximations, ignoring friction and
air resistance. Rather, the language-games stand there as objects of comparison which,
through similarities and dissimilarities, are meant to throw light on features of
our language’ (Wittgenstein 2009, §130). For a discussion of Wittgenstein’s relation
to genealogy, see Bangu (2018); Glock (2008a, 2008b, 2017) and particularly Glock
(2006, pp. 296–303), where Glock compares and contrasts Wittgenstein’s ‘remarks
on the natural history of human beings’ (Wittgenstein 2009, §415) with Williams’s
genealogical method.
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model; the closer this brings us to some generic form of the target
practice, the better the genealogist’s claim to having identified
its practical origins and what it does for us; (3) is exemplified by
Craig’s genealogy of the concept of knowledge (1990).
(4) pragmatic genealogy tailored to a socio-historical situation: on the basis
of an initial hypothesis about the original point of target practice
X, construct a dynamic model showing why creatures like us
would go in for a prototypical version of the target practice by
identifying root needs generating a problem to which the proto-
practice forms a salient solution; consider the proto-practice’s
elaboration in response to furthergeneric needs anticipatable from
within the model; then incorporate into the model increasingly
socio-historically local needs which history tells us arose, and
consider the proto-practice’s elaboration in response to thesemore
local needs; the closer this brings us to our local form of the target
practice, the better the genealogist’s claim to having identified that
practice’s practical origins andwhat it does for us now and around
here; (4) is exemplified by Williams’s genealogy of truthfulness
(2002) and by his construction of a political concept of freedom
tailored to our needs as liberals living under modernity (2005).
This typology already conveys something of the understanding of
pragmatic genealogy I want to work with, but it will be helpful to flesh
out what exactly pragmatic genealogy involves on the conception of it
that I want to defend. On this conception, pragmatic genealogy stands
to more regularly historiographical genealogymuch as sense-making in
terms of practical pressures stands to sense-making in terms of causal-
historical processes. Imagine having to explain to someone utterly
unfamiliar with our culture why a car has the shape it does. One could
do it by enumerating the stages of the car’s actual formation on the
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assembly line, thereby describing the causal construction of the car; or one
could explain the design of a finished car as reflecting a series of needs,
thereby offering a pragmatic reconstruction of the car.8 Most basically, the
design of a car reflects a need formobility; but it is further determined by
the need to see practically relevant parts of one’s surroundings, the need
to stay warm and dry, the need to sit comfortably—and so on, down
to the need to follow socio-historically local aesthetic trends. Picture a
computer animation starting out from a primitive geometrical shape
and gradually reaching something recognisably car-like by successively
factoring in the various needs of car-users and warping the shape to
meet them. The stages of this formation process would not correspond
to the steps involved in actually assembling a car. But they would
reveal how various aspects of car design reflect and answer to a specific
combination of needs.
Similarly, the primary target system of a pragmatic genealogical
model is the set of needs that have gone into shaping our conceptual
practices; generalising the interpretation of Craig’s genealogy proposed
by Martin Kusch and Robin McKenna (Kusch 2009, 2011, 2013; Kusch
and McKenna 2018a), we can view pragmatic genealogies as dynamic
models that work through idealisation and de-idealisation, aiming to offer
perspicuous representations of the needs at the roots of our conceptual
practices that are salient and illuminating for given purposes.9 The
8 The example is inspired by Kappel (2010).
9 The fact that they involve idealisation need not be a shortcoming of such models:
the view that idealisation can enhance rather than impede understanding has been
gaining increasing support since the 1980s; see Strevens (2008, ch. 8),Weisberg (2007),
Elgin (2007), and the essays in Grimm, Baumberger, and Ammon (2016). We can
distinguish three styles of idealisation. A pragmatic genealogy might resort either to
idealisation by abstraction (i.e. the stripping away of non-essential features)—what is
known as ‘Aristotelian’ idealisation (Cartwright 1989); or to idealisation by distortion
(i.e. the operation with assumptions known to be false)—what is known as ‘Galilean’
idealisation (McMullin 1985); or to the mixture of both which is known as ‘caricature’
(Frigg and Hartmann 2017). See Kusch and McKenna (2018a) for further discussion.
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‘fictionalising’ of pragmatic genealogy is thus nothing new-fangled or
mysterious; it is the fictionalising of model-building, and prima facie
neither more nor less suspicious than models in the social and natural
sciences, or than models in the rest of philosophy.10
Yet pragmatic genealogy not only enriches the consideration of the
actualwith that of the hypothetical; it also seeks to turn static into dynamic
understanding: to help us understand not just how our conceptual
practices reflect certain generic needs, but also how they reflect a
complex history involving the recalibration, elaboration, or elimination
of needs as well as the addition of new needs. This is why the models
of pragmatic genealogy are dynamicmodels—models with a time axis,
constrained by the demand that the models depict needs we have
actually had, derive needs from needs in plausible and tractable ways,
and issue in conceptual practices we recognise.
Two steps are involved in giving such pragmatic genealogies, the
first involving idealisation, the second de-idealisation: (Step 1) render
plausible a hypothesis about why creatures of our ilk would go in for
a prototype of the conceptual practice we have—call this the ‘proto-
practice’, an idealised version of a conceptual practice that need not
be realised in our actual practices;11 (Step 2) explain how we got from
the proto-practice to the practice we actually have—call this the ‘target
practice’. The pragmatic genealogymust identify inwhat respects, if any,
the proto-practice still differs from the target practice, for it is reaching
something like the practice we knowwhich provides what in the theory
10 For a defence of model-building in philosophy, see Williamson (2017).
11 Idealisation is what gets us from our actual practices to a prototypical version of a
particular conceptual practice which need not be realised in our actual practices. A
paradigm case of a conceptual practice, by contrast, is necessarily realised in our
actual practices. But for our purposes, little depends on this last claim—if one treats
‘paradigm case’ as another name for prototypes reached through idealisation, Fricker
would be engaged in (2), prototype-based explanation, and would be dispensing
with the historicising but not with the fictionalising.
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of models is known as ‘external validation’ (Kusch 2013, p. 93). To
this end, the model must be de-idealised in the direction of our cultural
situation by (a) describing the proto-practice’s primary elaboration, i.e.
its development driven by the practical pressures internal to the model,
such as the foreseeable problems which the original solution offered
by the proto-practice will bring in its wake (this is what Craig does
when he considers how a concept of proto-knowledge indexed to the
subject’s needs and capacities would be driven to become increasingly
independent from those needs and capacities);12 and (b) describing
the proto-practice’s secondary elaboration, i.e. its development driven
by the introduction of increasingly socio-historically local needs into
the model and the new problems that come with them (this is what
Williams does when he considers the extension of truthfulness to the
distant past in Thucydides’s time and its elaboration into the value
of authenticity in the Romantic period).13 Both the primary and the
secondary elaboration can be additive rather than transformative,which
helps account for the internal diversity in the resulting practice. New
forms of the proto-practicemay come to rest alongside their predecessor
instead of replacing it.14
Insofar as the dynamicmodels of a pragmatic genealogy successively
incorporate ever more socio-historically local needs, they can be said to
move beyond the categorical divide between hypothetical and historical
genealogy: they constitute a hybrid form that is clearly an idealised
model rather than a description of actual history, but that also genuinely
12 See Craig (1990, pp. 82–97; 1993, pp. 81–115). See also Queloz (2019), Kusch (2009,
2011, 2013), and Kusch and McKenna (2018a, 2018b) for accounts of this process of
objectivisation.
13 See Williams (2002, chs. 7 and 8, respectively) as well as the reconstruction of
Williams’s genealogy in Queloz (2018b).
14 See Kusch (2009, 2013) for an account of Craig’s genealogy that emphasises the
importance of additive development.
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historicises the target practice by exhibiting it as the product of a
complex historical accumulation of needs. Although history can inform
the dynamic models of pragmatic genealogies, it is not the primary
purpose of these models to mirror historical development; it is rather
to extricate from history the main practical pressures and dynamics
that have shaped our conceptual practices and that help us understand
their retention, elaboration, and differentiation into a variety of forms.
An instructive example of a historically informed pragmatic ge-
nealogy is Williams’s genealogy of truthfulness, i.e. of the virtues of
accuracy and sincerity (2002). Williams starts out from a state-of-nature
model depicting a basic epistemic predicament: human beings need
information; but already the sheer fact that they are in different places
at different times means that there are strong practical pressures on
them not just to rely on their five senses in acquiring it, but to cooperate,
in particular by engaging in an epistemic division of labour whereby
information is pooled; this in turn means that they need to cultivate
the dispositions that make good contributors to the pool: centrally, the
prototypical forms of accuracy and sincerity that Williams (capitalising
the terms to mark their technical nature) labels ‘Accuracy’ and ‘Sincer-
ity’. But since the practical value of these dispositions consists in large
part not in their instrumental value for the individual who manifests
them, but in their advantageousness to others, Accuracy and Sincerity
need to come to be regarded as dispositions worth having for their own
sake—as virtues—if the practice of effective information pooling is not
to succumb to free riders. For this to be the case, people need to be able
to make sense of these dispositions as virtues, which requires being able
to relate them to other things that they value and to their emotions.
But to understand how all these generic needs have actually been
satisfied ‘now and around here’, and how our form of truthfulness
moreover has been ‘changed, transformed, differently embodied, ex-
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tended and so on’ (Williams 2007, p. 132) in answer to many further and
more historically local needs, we need to de-idealise our generic model
in our direction by incorporating increasingly local needs. We can then
explain further elaborations of Accuracy and Sincerity until we reach
something resembling the conceptual practiceswe know (Williams 2006,
pp. 191–92; 2014). This is whyWilliams de-idealises his dynamic model
of truthfulness by factoring in first the local needs of the ancient Greeks
that led to truthfulness’ extension to the distant past, then the even
more local needs of eighteenth-century society that led to truthfulness’
elaboration into a demand for authenticity, and finally the extremely
local need of modern-day liberals to cultivate truthfulness about political
history in order to maintain a sense of what can go wrong if individuals
cede too many of their rights to the state (Williams 2002, pp. 265–66).
In tailoring his dynamic model to the cultural situation that is more
specifically ours, Williams seeks to offer a perspicuous representation
of the entangled collection of historically accumulated needs to which
truthfulness answers and hence of the variety of respects in which
truthfulness is worth having. This representation enables us to place and
relate these aspects of truthfulness, thereby giving us a sense of which
aspects are explanatorily prior to which, how pressing or ineluctable
the needs are to which they respond, and what historical circumstances
these needs depend on. In a phrase we shall return to, this type of
genealogy helps us situate aspects of truthfulness and the needs they
answer to ‘in a philosophical and historical space’ (Williams 2005, p.
76). Williams’s elaboration of Craig’s methodology thus corresponds to
the move from generic pragmatic genealogy to pragmatic genealogy tailored
to a socio-historical situation.
Given this understanding of pragmatic genealogy, the question now
is when and why we should move from paradigm-based explanation to
pragmatic genealogy. Sometimes, paradigm-based explanation may be
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just what we need.15 But as we shall now see, there are cases where we
still have reason to engage in pragmatic genealogy.
2. Nietzsche’s Challenge
In order to understand the relevance of pragmatic genealogy to point-
based theorising, a methodological remark of Nietzsche’s—the arch-
genealogist—provides a useful entry-point. It is well-known that Ni-
etzsche takes a dim view of philosophers’ historical sense. But in the
Genealogy, he rebukes the ‘English genealogists’ specifically for think-
ing ahistorically in assuming that there is an instrumental connection
between our practices and timeless human needs (GM, Preface, §4, I, §2,
II, §§12-13).16 Both we and our practices change, and philosophers will
be led astray if they ignore the history that lies between the ‘Darwinian
beast’ and the ‘modernmilquetoast’ (GM, Preface, §7). This amounts to a
challenge—call it Nietzsche’s challenge—for all point-based explanations
from paradigm-based explanation to pragmatic genealogy. We might
offer point-based explanations in an experimental spirit, to see how far
15 Suppose we were puzzled about the nature of a certain item we talk about, as J. M.
Keynes was puzzled about the nature of probability. This led Keynes to suggest
that probability was concerned with objective and unanalysable relations between
propositions—to which F. P. Ramsey disarmingly objected that he himself did not
perceive such relations, and suspected others did not perceive them either (1990, p.
57). Instead, Ramsey suggested that in the paradigm case, the point of probability
statements was to express one’s confidence or degree of belief in the occurrence of
events in order to align one’s degrees of belief with those of others and with the
frequencies of events in a way that was conducive to successful action. Probability
‘is a measurement of belief qua basis of action’ (1990, p. 67). Ramsey demystified
probability by relating it to human needs and actions rather than to mysterious
objective relations, and in this context, this was just what was called for (Misak 2016,
pp. 175-8).
16 For evidence to the effect that the earlyNietzsche himself practiced a fairly ahistorical
form of pragmatic genealogy, see Queloz (2017, Manuscript). For a discussion of
the role of history in Nietzsche’s mature thought which argues that Nietzsche was
a critic rather than an advocate of genealogical debunking, see Queloz and Cueni
(2019).
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we get on the assumption that the connection obtains. But Nietzsche’s
challenge is that the connection may well not obtain, because we or our
conceptual practices have changed, and then point-based explanations
become—in more than one sense—pointless.
We learn much about the contours of point-based explanations by
determining how they deal with Nietzsche’s challenge. On the one
hand, it raises the question of how they handle the historical inflection,
differentiation, and repurposing of conceptual practices. On the other
hand, it brings out that Fricker, Williams, and Craig—the modern-day
‘English genealogists’—ground their explanations in highly generic
needs—the ‘humanly basic’ and ‘humanly necessary’ (Fricker 2016,
180), ‘universal requirements’ (Williams 2014, p. 409), ‘needs of the
very basic kind’ deriving from ‘facts . . . so general, indeed, that one
cannot imagine their changing whilst anything we can still recognise
as social life persists’ (Craig 1990, pp. 4, 10). This raises the further
question ofwhetherpoint-basedexplanations are committed to thinking
ahistorically about the needs to which they seek to relate our practices.
By putting a spotlight on the possibility of historical change, Niet-
zsche’s challenge throws two features of point-based explanations into
relief. As long as point-based explanations are understood as operating
only with generic needs—needs which, according to our best under-
standing of them, humans have anyway—the following two conditions
must be fulfilled for them to get a grip:
(i) the conceptual practice at issue must bear some instrumental
relation to certain generic human needs—call this the Generic
Needs Condition;
(ii) a paradigm case of the conceptual practice must be available
which exhibits this relation—call this the Paradigm Case Condition.
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Nietzsche’s challenge puts pressure on both conditions, since a great
deal of change at the level either of our conceptual practices or of our
needs may well result in a given conceptual practice fulfilling neither
the Generic Needs Condition nor the Paradigm Case Condition.
My aim in this section is to examine how point-based explanations
deal with Nietzsche’s challenge, and how pragmatic genealogy in
particular helps us do so. I shall first discuss the case in which the
Generic Needs Condition is fulfilled while the Paradigm Case Condition is
not; then the case in which it is uncertain evenwhether theGeneric Needs
Condition is fulfilled; and, lastly, the case in which neither condition is
fulfilled.
2.1. Constructing Paradigm Cases
Consider the case in which the Generic Needs Condition is fulfilled while
the Paradigm Case Condition is not: a conceptual practice still bears some
instrumental relation to generic human needs, but it lacks a paradigm
case exhibiting that relation. The problem for point-based explanations
is then not that the connection between the conceptual practice and
generic needs is severedbyhistorical change. TheGenericNeeds Condition
still holds. But the function once discharged by a single practice may
now be jointly discharged by a constellation of different practices into
which the original practice has differentiated in the course of history.
Or the problem may be that the Generic Needs Condition holds all too
well—a multiplicity of functions served by a practice over time may
have been layered into it to such a degree that a paradigm case becomes
difficult to identify. Where repurposing only ‘obscure[s]’ (GM, II, §12)
previous functions, practices can accumulate a rich historical deposit.
There may then not be such a thing as the current point of a particular
conceptual practice, because repeated alteration and repurposing have
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layered such a multitude of functions into it that neither a paradigm
case nor an overall point can be recovered from the resulting mess. A
good example—Nietzsche’s own—is the practice of punishment:
[T]he history of its exploitation for the most diverse purposes, finally
crystallizes into a kind of unity that is difficult to dissolve, difficult to
analyze and—one must emphasize—is completely and utterly unde-
finable. (Today it is impossible to say for sure why we actually punish:
all concepts in which an entire process is semiotically summarized
elude definition; only that which has no history is definable). (GM, II,
§13)
If we look back to the various functions a practice has discharged, we
can discern ‘how the elements of the synthesis change their valence and
rearrange themselves accordingly, so that now this, now that element
comes to the fore and dominates at the expense of the remaining ones’,
and how ‘in some cases one element (say the purpose of deterrence)
seems to cancel out all the rest of the elements’ (GM, II, §13). But because
a practice’s function at any one time only seems to cancel out previous
functions, a complex and internally diverse deposit can form which
not only defies analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions,
but also elucidation by means of a paradigm case exhibiting its core
function. Nietzsche goes on to list eleven other functions layered up in
the practice. ‘Punishment’, he concludes, ‘is overladen with functions of
all kinds’ (GM, II, §14). In dealing with practices of this sort, paradigm-
based explanation will either fail to get a grip on the practice or distort
our understanding of it by projecting a functional uniformity onto it
which it does not possess.
One reaction to this would be for paradigm-based explanation to try
to capture the multiplicity of functions in a conceptual practice through
multiple paradigm-based explanations of it.17 But this will quickly seem
17 The concept of knowledge is another example of a conceptual practice that has invited
multiple hypotheses concerning its function(s). Apart from Craig’s contention that
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arbitrary and ad hoc. More importantly, it will raise the question of how
the various functions relate to each other. Does pragmatic genealogy
fare any better?
On one interpretation of pragmatic genealogy, which has been de-
fended by Fricker and helps explain her shift from pragmatic genealogy
to paradigm-based explanation, it does not fare better.18 What makes
pragmatic genealogy and paradigm-based explanation equally power-
ful in Fricker’s eyes is that she interprets the genealogies as not only
starting out from a prototype, but as suggesting also that the prototype
is really the paradigm case or core of our actual practice: ‘The key is
to see that . . . what is claimed about the State of Nature—for instance,
that it contains a concept or practice with such and such features—is
really a claim about what is basic (or ‘core’) in our actual concept or
practice’ (Forthcoming, p. 7). On this interpretation, the two methods
stand on an equal footing, because the temporal priority articulated by
pragmatic genealogies is a metaphor for explanatory priority within our
actual practice. The time axis of pragmatic genealogies really serves
as an expository device: it allows us to organise internally diverse
it serves to flag good informants and the numerous elaborations of that hypothesis
(Hannon 2013, 2015; Henderson 2011; Kusch and McKenna 2018b; McKenna 2014,
2015), its function has been thought to be to signal that inquiry is at an end (Kappel
2010; Kelp 2011; Rysiew 2012), to identify propositions we can treat as reasons for
acting (McGrath 2015), to provide assurance (Lawlor 2013), to distinguish between
blameless and blameworthy behaviour (Beebe 2012), or to honour the subject of
knowledge attributions (Kusch 2009). See also Moore (1993), Kusch and McKenna
(2018a), and Gerken (2017, chs. 3 and 9) as well as the essays in Greco andHenderson
(2015) for overviews and critical discussions. I agree with Kusch and McKenna
(2018a) that a conceptual practice can come to serve a plurality of functions in the
course of its history, going from a single-purpose to a multipurpose tool, like a Swiss
Army knife. To integrate those among the functional hypotheses that are compatible
with each other, what is needed is a master model that brings order into the plurality
of functions and indicates which are basic and which are after-thoughts. I argue
below that pragmatic genealogy provides just such a master model that helps us
place and relate the various functions in a philosophical and historical space.
18 See Fricker (Forthcoming); also Fricker (1998, 2010, 2016).
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practices by first isolating what are offered up as explanatorily basic
features and then successively adding further, increasingly complex but
recognisably derivative features into the picture. On this interpretation,
pragmatic genealogies are really circuitous versions of paradigm-based
explanations.19 This interpretation licenses the conclusion that the
temporal dimension of pragmatic genealogies can safely be collapsed
into the here and now as long as we find some otherway of highlighting
the explanatorily basic. And this is precisely the task shouldered by
Fricker’s paradigm cases.
Fricker’s interpretation combines two ideas to formwhatwemay call
the actualist interpretation of pragmatic genealogy: (a) that themovement
in a genealogy from earlier to later stages does not represent a temporal
movement from our conjectured hominid past to the present, and is
therefore far removed from the influential conception of genealogy
as ‘history, correctly practised’;20 and (b) that the primitive form of a
practice considered in the state of nature actually stands for a paradigm
case of our actual practice, and that therefore the genealogical derivation
of the less basic from the more basic can be safely collapsed into a
description of our actual ways of going on. This interpretation of
pragmatic genealogy undeniably has much going for it. By reading
genealogy as involving neither an inference from fiction to reality nor
one from past to present, it alleviates worries about how fictional state-
of-nature stories can tell us anything about reality, and it deflects the
charge of the genetic fallacy, i.e. the alleged mistake of deducing claims
about the present features of something from claims about its genesis.
19 Whether, on Fricker’s interpretation, the difference between pragmatic genealogy
and paradigm-based explanation reduces to a difference in presentation is a question
we can leave open here. If this were the case, Fricker would have moved from a less
to a more perspicuous way of doing the same thing.
20 Nehamas (1985,p. 246n1). This historiographical conception of genealogy is endorsed
by Geuss (1999, pp. 22–23), Owen (2007, p. 143), Merrick (2009), and Migotti (2016).
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The main drawback of this actualist interpretation, however, is that it
makes pragmatic genealogy just as vulnerable to Nietzsche’s challenge
as paradigm-based explanation: both, on this reading, move from one
element in our actual practices, which they present as explanatorily
and practically basic, to other elements in those practices, which they
present as derivative. This means that they both depend on there
being, within our actual practices, a paradigmatic core form which is
conspicuously functional given generic human needs and which can
give us an explanatory and critical grip on the conceptual practice at
issue. On the actualist interpretation, paradigm-based explanation and
pragmatic genealogy are in the same boat.
But if, as I have suggested,we interpret pragmatic genealogy as hypo-
thetical and dynamic rather than as actualist and static, it does fare better
than paradigm-based explanation when paradigm cases are missing.
We can join Fricker inmaintaining (a), that themovement in a genealogy
from earlier to later stages does not represent a temporal movement
from our conjectured hominid past to the present, while denying (b),
that it is a movement from paradigmatic to non-paradigmatic forms
of our actual ways of going on. We can understand genealogy instead
as a movement from a strongly idealised model of a practice to a less
idealised model of it—as a movement of de-idealisation in the direction
of our actual cultural situation.
An advantage of this dynamic model interpretation of pragmatic
genealogy is that it does not depend on a paradigmatic form being
extant; where history has failed to provide us with a paradigmatic form
highlighting a practice’s functional relation to generic needs, pragmatic
genealogy can construct one. We can organise and elucidate the complex
amalgam that is our target practice using a simplified practice. And
we can then also model how we might have gotten here from there,
where ‘there’ does not refer to some datable moment of emergence,
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but to an abstractly characterised basic predicament of which our
present situation is a particular, socio-historically local manifestation.
The resulting dynamicmodelwill be able to serve aswhatWilliams calls
a ‘plan’ that helps us place and relate the various further developments
and acquired functions of the practice ‘in a philosophical and historical
space’ (2005, p. 76)—not the two-dimensional space of our current
practice, as the actualist interpretation has it, but the three-dimensional
space along the quasi-historical time axis of the dynamicmodel. In other
words, pragmatic genealogy can act as a kind of master model that helps
us situate, contextualise, and account for each of the different functions
a practice acquired in different contexts, thereby imposing a form of
order on the irreducibly varied synthesis that Nietzsche describes. The
measure of the quality of that model will be its ability to make sense of
the internal diversity of the practice and of the multiplicity of functions
laid up in it.
An important consequence of this interpretation of pragmatic ge-
nealogy is that making sense of a target practice using a proto-practice
does not commit us to the further claim that the proto-practice is now
extant as the core of the target practice. Admittedly, Craig (2007, p. 191)
seems to think both that his concept of proto-knowledge sheds light
on the concept of knowledge and that it forms the core of our actual
concept, but this has been deemed an unnecessary weakness in his
account (Kusch 2011). Williams also sometimes uses the imagery of a
core and its historical variations (2005, p. 76; 2014, p. 407), but whether
he would be prepared to point to any actual instance of truthfulness
as the core of truthful behaviour is less than clear. The core imagery
seems to refer to what is central to the explanation rather than to our
practices. However that may be, the important point for our purposes
is that on the dynamic model interpretation, we can in fact coherently
maintain all the following claims: first, that given certain generic needs
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that humans have anyway, they will need to see a certain function
discharged, and we can illuminatingly construct a prototype of what
a conceptual practice discharging it might look like; second, that this
function is being discharged by our current conceptual practices; and
third, that there is no one core form of our conceptual practices which
directly corresponds to the prototype and conspicuously discharges
that function. Just because the prototype is explanatorily basic does not
mean that it is, or has ever been, extant.
The idiom of core and historical variation (Williams 2014, p. 407)
or periphery (Fricker 2010) can be misleading in that regard, as it
encourages thinking of the evolution of our conceptual practices on the
model of a snowball: the original core accumulates additional layers as it
rolls down the slopes of history, but by the time it ends up in our valley,
though there are various accretions, the core is still there.21 This is an
improvement on the ‘English genealogists’ that Nietzsche rebukes for
simply equating the current function of our practices with their original
function. But we can take the injunction to think historically about
functions a step further. Just as a snowball may encounter an obstacle
that leads it to break up into pieces which roll down different paths and
grow into different shapes, a conceptual practice may differentiate into
a family of related practices in response to a differentiation in needs, each
practice tailored to specific contexts. They may still jointly discharge the
function which the practice originally emerged to discharge; but there
may be no one form of the practice that is in any sense the ‘core’ form.
Whether or not such ‘core’ or paradigm cases are available is of
course not clear a priori, and the value of paradigm-based explanation is
best appreciated if we understand it as being offered in an experimental
spirit: we hypothesise a candidate paradigm case in order to seewhether
21 Kusch (2011, p. 19) calls this the ‘avalanche model’ of genealogy.
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there is indeed a plausible paradigm case available. But if not, I have
been arguing, all is not lost for point-based explanations. We can
then fall back on pragmatic genealogy and try to derive explanatory
enlightenment from the construction of a prototype, together with an
account of why our actual ways of going on have come to differ from it.
2.2. The Roots of Continuity
So far, we have assumed that the Generic Needs Condition obtains: that
the conceptual practice at issue still bears some instrumental relation
to generic human needs. But why, once we are mindful of the wide
array of contingencies and reinterpretations of which our practices are
the product, should we remain confident that this is so? Nietzsche’s
challenge reminds us that we must be wary of the philosopher’s foible
of mistaking a failure of imagination for an insight into necessity.
Here also pragmatic genealogy proves a valuable addition to our
repertoire. A pragmatic genealogy can be seen as an argumentative chain
underscoring the assumption that a practice is a functional solution
to some predicament we are bound to face on a continuous basis. It
can reveal complicated instrumental relations between our practices
and our needs even when we do not know they are there, and when
the blank assertion that they obtain would not by itself be enough to
convince.
The developmental narrative of a pragmatic genealogy is best under-
stood as a derivation of needs from needs: humans have a need for A,
hence a need for B, . . . , hence a need for X, where X is the prototypical
form of the target practice. This gives pragmatic genealogy an edge over
approaches that limit themselves to pointing out how a given practice
is functional relative to one particular set of needs—how blame serves
a need for moral alignment, say, or how talk of probabilities serves a
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need to communicate and adjust our confidence in the occurrence of
events. In the genealogical mode, we can present these fairly sophis-
ticated needs as growing out of more primitive needs, and these out
of even more primitive ones, until we reach what we are willing to
regard as needs we uncontroversially have anyway. This enables us to
derive needs we are not disposed to think we continuously have (e.g., a
practical need to value accuracy and sincerity intrinsically) from needs
we are disposed to think we continuously have (e.g., a practical need
for information and cooperation). When a function is being ascribed
to something which we did not necessarily expect to be functional at
all—to such venerable ideas as knowledge, justice, or truthfulness, for
example—tracing out a chain of practical demands linking these high-
flown abstracta to mundane concerns can make us more comfortable
with the idea that these are functional responses to enduring challenges.
Few will balk at the suggestion that our practice of thinking in terms of
the conceptwater answers to enduring human needs; but the suggestion
that concepts like knowledge, justice, or truthfulness do the same may
sound at first rather like the Panglossian claim that the bridge of the
nose is there to rest glasses on. Pragmatic genealogy can help alleviate
these worries by deriving needs we did not know we had from needs
we knew we had, thereby revealing even the seemingly ethereal or
transient to be firmly rooted in enduring human concerns. In this
sense, a state-of-nature model can act as a representation of the roots of
continuity in the demands we face.
Moreover, the genealogical perspective allows us to argue that the
proto-practice we seek to present as a solution to a problem could in fact
have emergedwithout assuming implausible forms of foresight or intent.
A practice may constitute a solution to a problem, but that solution
may be inaccessible through individual instrumental reasoning—for
instance, because it requires solving a coordination problem, or because
25 • Matthieu Queloz
it involves the essentially social process of constructing an intrinsic
value.22 In such cases, one way in which genealogical explanation
can add to our understanding is by sketching a mechanism through
which such obstacles might be overcome quite naturally, without much
foresight or intent.23
A pragmatic genealogy can thus domore to earn its conclusion than
a non-genealogical ascription of functionality. If we accept, first, that the
generic needs which operate as premises in the story are needs we share
in some form; second, that the derivation from them of less primitive
needs is valid; and third, that there are ways in which these might
have driven us to develop certain conceptual practices in response, then
we shall have been given a reason to expect there to be, in our actual
cultural situation, some conceptual practice, or perhaps a constellation
of conceptual practices, which is instrumental to the satisfaction of
generic needs—and therefore a reason to think that the Generic Needs
Condition obtains.
2.3. Incorporating Local Needs
Lastly, the deepest engagementwithNietzsche’s challenge is demanded
when both the Generic Needs Condition and the Paradigm Case Condition
cease to obtain. This will be the case to the extent to which practices are
local outgrowths of history that do not bear illuminating relations to
generic human needs. Must point-based explanations, and in particular
pragmatic genealogies, lose all explanatory force once the connection
to generic needs gives out, or can they still provide illumination even
then?
22 Williams (2000, p. 156n6).
23 A well-known example is Hume’s genealogy of the virtue of ‘justice’ as respect
for property (T, 3.2.2). See Wiggins (2006), Garrett (2007) and Blackburn (2008) for
interpretations germane to the present discussion.
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They can—by augmenting our understanding of conceptual prac-
tices, insofar as they fail to be amenable to elucidation by generic needs,
with an understanding in terms of their point given local needs. It is
tempting to think that local needs lie beyond the ken of point-based
explanation, since, as we saw, Craig, Williams, and Fricker all make a
point of grounding their explanations in highly generic and humanly
basic needs. Does this imply amethodological restriction to universal or
generic needs? Are point-based explanations called for only in dealing
with anthropological necessities? Craig explicitly denies this:
Anysociety thathas awell-developed language . . . consists of creatures
that have reached a considerable degree of mental complexity. Any
number of different sorts of need may, for all we know to the contrary,
follow in the wake of this complexity; so there is no a priori reason to
think that we are tied by methodological principles to considering
only needs of the very basic kind that I have actually tried to restrict
myself to. (1990, p. 4)
As this passage brings out, understanding our conceptual practices as
tools responding to our needs should not commit us to understanding
them only in terms of generic needs. Such a focus on the needs we
have anyway to the exclusion of needs we acquired or lost in the
course of history would again be vulnerable to the Nietzschean charge
of ahistorical thinking. To view all our conceptual practices as tools
helping us cope with needs we have anyway would be to fall into the
kind of reductive naturalism which assumes, as Robert Brandom (2011,
p. 140) puts it, that we could safely dismiss Romantic poetry by asking
what it has ever done for our biological fitness.
Rightly understood, point-based explanations are not methodolog-
ically restricted to elucidating the point of our conceptual practices
in the light of universal or generic needs. We might in principle even
construct a state-of-nature model starting out from requirements that
are fundamental and non-negotiable for us, in full knowledge of the fact
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that other cultures did not share these needs. A precedent is theOriginal
Position as conceived by John Rawls in his later work (1993): contrary
to his earlier interpretation in A Theory of Justice (1971), the later Rawls
no longer viewed the model of the Original Position as a representation
of a timeless problem that any society faces, but as a representation of
a local problem: the problem of arriving at a conception of justice that
is justifiable to us, the citizens of heterogenous modern constitutional
democracies.24
There is thus no reason why point-based explanations cannot get a
grip on socio-historically local practices by relating them to local needs.
This is a strategy that is also open to paradigm-based explanation. But
there are two respects in which pragmatic genealogy proves particularly
apt at dealing with local needs.
First, while paradigm-based explanation only relates current con-
ceptual practices to current needs, pragmatic genealogy can exploit
the fact that the connection between needs and practices also holds
dynamically: it can additionally relate changes in conceptual practices
to changes in needs.25 The grip that pragmatic genealogy gives us on
changes in our conceptual practices is a further respect in which it adds
something to paradigm-based explanation. This equips it to answer
24 See also Queloz and Cueni (Manuscript).
25 Changes in needs can in turn be related to social change. In this sense, as Kusch
(2009, p. 70) highlights, genealogy systematically exploits the connection between
the evolution of conceptual practices and the development of social relations. A good
example—again augmenting generic pragmatic genealogy with local needs—is
Kusch’s elaboration of Craig’s genealogy of knowledge on the basis of Steven
Shapin’s A Social History of Truth (1994). Kusch seeks to explain the observation that
to attribute knowledge is to attribute status, freedom, and social power in terms
of inquirers’ need to identify reliable—because disinterested—informants plus the
historical circumstance that in seventeenth-century England, social relations were
such that a concept tracking disinterested informants would end up tracking nobility,
financial independence, freedom, and social power (Kusch 2009, pp. 83–87). See also
Gardiner (2015, pp. 38–39) for an illuminating discussion of this example.
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Nietzsche’s challenge by incorporating historical change into its dynamic
model. It does this by incorporating local needs into the dynamic model,
turning it into an historically informeddynamicmodel inwhich changes
in historical circumstances are reflected as changes in our needs. This
allows pragmatic genealogy to render conceptual change rationally
intelligible: to understand why, as we saw in the reconstruction of
Williams’s genealogy of truthfulness, ideas of truthfulness changed at
certain junctures in history, and thus ultimately why our ideas of truth-
fulness came to have the specific shape they have as opposed to other
shapes they have had in the past. Of course, what needs concept-users
find themselves with can in turn be explained in terms of alterations in
their circumstances, and in this sense, what needs we find ourselves
with will to some extent only be causally intelligible as the result of
contingent historical change. But our conceptual practices are no less
necessary for that. Insofar as the needs we contingently have generate
real problems that necessitate solutions, the conceptual practices pro-
viding those solutions will be necessary for us. Given certain needs,
however local, certain conceptual practices could not viably be different.
They provide necessary solutions to contingent problems.
Second, pragmatic genealogy can offer what we might call a com-
prehensive view of a conceptual practice: one that brings out both the
respects in which it serves generic needs and the respects in which it
serves increasingly local needs while also placing and relating these
aspects of the practice in its dynamic model, thereby situating them in
a historical and philosophical space. It situates them in a historical space
insofar as we understand which aspects of the practice are the product
of highly general facts about us, and which are the product of more
particular historical circumstances (as well as which circumstances
these are and in what order they arise). And we situate them in a
philosophical space insofar as we understand their relative importance
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and ineluctability: Do they answer to pressing needs? Are these needs
we cannot but have, or are they needs we can eradicate by changing
our circumstances?
Apart from Williams’s genealogy of truthfulness, another example
of a pragmatic genealogy that achieves such a comprehensive view of a
conceptual practice by bringing out, placing, and relating the respects
in which it answers to generic and local needs is Williams’s account
of liberty ‘as a value for us in our world’ (2005, p. 75). He constructs
a dynamic model beginning with the universal need for ‘primitive
freedom’—a pre-political notion of freedom from constraint by other
individuals (Williams reserves the term ‘liberty’ for the political notion
of freedom). In pursuing their primitive freedom, individuals will
impinge on each other’s freedom spheres, and one individual’s desire
satisfaction will be another individual’s coercion. A basic problem
emerges: where does one freedom sphere end and the other begin?
Disagreement over this generates violence and instability. This gives
rise to the need for a public conflict-resolver, an allocator of freedom
spheres. But if this allocator of freedom spheres is not to replace
private by public coercion, there needs to be a distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate uses of public power. Consequently, there
is a need for legitimating concepts that permit this distinction. But
wherever this need is manifest, the required legitimating concepts
will have to be fleshed out in terms of a legitimation story, which, by
drawing for example on transcendent sources of authority, must justify
to each citizen why public power can be used to restrict people’s
freedom in some ways rather than others. The basic political problem
highlighted by Williams’s genealogy is that we need some legitimating
concepts enabling a distinction between good and bad government. But
these needs cannot by themselves determine which concepts these will
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be—whether the legitimation stories will draw on the idea of liberty,
for example, or on theological or transcendent sources of legitimacy.
Ifwe takemore local needs and circumstances into account, however,
it becomes clearer why liberty is so important to a more local ‘us’.
Under conditions of modernity, truthful inquiry and historical self-
consciousness have eroded many myths and narratives that formed the
stuff of past legitimation stories, leaving us with less material for our
legitimation stories; and once these sources of legitimation fall away,
there will be a stronger presumption in favour of citizens’ freedom to do
what they want. We are more concerned with liberty than past societies
because ‘we start, in a sense, with less’ (2005, p. 95)—in particular, less
by which to justify restricting liberty. This not only helps explain our
special concern with liberty, but also shows that we are rightly more
concerned with liberty by presenting our heightened concern with
liberty as an expression of truthfulness.
The value of a comprehensive viewof our conceptual practices is that
it safeguards us from two ways in which our view of them can be overly
simplistic: one is by understanding the practice exclusively as a response
to generic needs when it also answers to local needs; the other is by
understanding the practice exclusively as a response to local needswhen
it also answers to generic needs. Both kinds of simplifications should be
avoided, becausewe ideallywant to understand all the respects inwhich
a practice answers to needs—for explanatory purposes, of course, but
quite particularly also for revisionary or critical purposes. If we fixate on
generic needs that make a conceptual practice seem well worth having,
we run the risk ofmissing the respects in which its local form also serves
local needs that may be problematic, and to that extent give us reason to
abandon or alter the conceptual practice. Conversely, when we find that
a conceptual practice serves local needs we find problematic, and to that
extent have reason to abandon or alter the practice, this insight should
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be enriched with a grasp of the extent to which the practice also serves
generic needs of a very basic and hence easily overlooked sort, because
this will show us how we should not go about tampering with our
conceptual practices by alerting us to what we stand to lose. If Hume’s
pragmatic genealogy of property (T, 3.2.2) is sound, for example, then
some form of property is something we cannot do without if society
is not to descend into chaos and violent conflict over external goods,
however correct Rousseau’s (1977) diagnosis that certain elaborations of
the institution of property also serve the problematic needs of insatiable
individuals suffering from inflamed amour-propre.26
Pragmatic genealogy, then, does much to help us meet Nietzsche’s
challenge. First, while paradigm-based explanation depends on practices
including a suitably paradigmatic core form that is subservient to
human needs and will fail to get a grip where such a form is unavail-
able, pragmatic genealogy—on the dynamic model interpretation—can
construct a proto-practice by which to shed light on the target practice.
Second, pragmatic genealogy need not blithely assume that generic
human needs are still informative, but can offer an argument for it,
an argument which might reveal instrumental relations between our
conceptual practices and our needs which we did not know were there.
And third, insofar as Nietzsche’s challenge is indeed devastating to the
attempt of any point-based explanation to elucidate our current ways of
going on in the light of generic human needs, such explanations can still
provide insight by highlighting the point of a practice given local needs.
History—and more broadly, social understanding—should inform our
model-building not only in selecting the needs and the hypothesis
about the original point we start out from, but also in incorporating
26 On Hume’s genealogy of property, see Baier (1988, 2010); Cohon (2008). On
Rousseau’s more critical genealogy of self-love and its harnessing of property,
see Neuhouser (2012, 2014).
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increasingly local needs into our genealogy. This enables us to link
generic prototypes to the conceptual practices we actually find now
and around here, thereby bringing out and situating the respects in
which these simultaneously answer to needs ranging from the highly
generic to the extremely local.
Conclusion
In light of Nietzsche’s challenge, paradigm-based explanation thus
turns out not to be enough. Point-based explanations cannot entirely
dispense with the fictionalising and historicising of genealogy. We need
pragmatic genealogy, and we need to conceive of it not as a baroque
form of paradigm-based explanation, but as a genuine elaboration of it
that expands the repertoire of point-based explanation with dynamic
models capable of situating generic and local needs in a historical
and philosophical space. Pragmatic genealogy’s fictionalising, model-
building aspect earns its keep by helping us achieve a grip where
paradigm-based explanation fails to get a grip, namely on historically
inflected conceptual practices that lack a paradigm case or an obvious
connection to generic human needs. And its historicising, dynamic
aspect earns its keep by helping us de-idealise our models in order to
understand how our conceptual practices reflect a complex historical
amalgamation of generic and local practical pressures. For these reasons,
pragmatic genealogy proves an irreplaceable tool in the toolkit of those
who seek to understand our practices in terms of their point.
If we want to move beyond potentially simplistic views of our
conceptual practices that focus exclusively on how they serve highly
generic needs, therefore, we would do well to resort to the historically
informed dynamic models of pragmatic genealogy, because these are
tailored to convey a nuanced and comprehensive view of our conceptual
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practices as reflecting a combination of generic and socio-historically
local needs. This conclusion holds equally for approaches suffering
from the reverse problem of focusing exclusively on how a conceptual
practice serves highly local needs, and thus risk missing the respects
in which the practice also serves important generic needs. Here also,
both for explanatory and for revisionary purposes, we want a nuanced
and comprehensive view. When we find that a practice serves local
needs we find problematic, we should supplement this insight with an
understanding of the extent to which the practice also serves generic
needs of a familiar and easily overlooked sort. This need not mean that
we should not tamper with the practice. But it will help us revise it
responsibly.
The method of pragmatic genealogy, which shows how the present
shape of a conceptual practice reflects a complex historical accumu-
lation of old and generic as well as new and local needs, is uniquely
suited to helping us understand such nuances. And these nuances are
crucial if we are to make sense, not just of the practical significance our
conceptual practices would have were we as rough-hewn as the proto-
typical humanoids depicted in the state of nature, or of the significance
they would have if they answered solely to parochial needs, but of the
significance they actually have, now and around here.27
27 I would like to thank the Editors and Associate Editors of MIND as well as two
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